Content-Based, Secondary Effects, and Expressive
Conduct: What in the World Do They Mean
(and What Do They Mean to the United States
Supreme Court)?
Ofer Raban *

INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the proper form of constitutional

doctrines.
The issue achieved prominence with the famous
categorizers/balancers debate,' and has only gained in significance
since. Kathleen M. Sullivan, in a recent article, suggests that one
meaningful way to understand the divisions among United States
Supreme Court Justices is not through the liberal/conservative
dichotomy, but rather through the rules/standards debate, a debate
concerning the form of doctrinal articulations. Simply put, both the
categorizers/balancers and the rules/standards debates pit the
proponents of bright-line constitutional doctrines against those
advocating flexible and malleable constitutional standards.
This Article is an examination of three constitutional doctrines
from the perspective of the bright-line/flexible-standard opposition.
The Article takes a strong stance against the conversion of the brightline content-based/content-neutral First Amendment doctrine into a
more flexible standard. This position is in no way an ideological one;
it is not a position that embraces bright-line rules or flexible
standards as "always the right choice." Instead, the position is based
solely on considerations relating to the correctness of judicial
B.A., City College of New York, 1994; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1999. Mr.
Raban is currently pursuing a doctorate in legal philosophy at Oxford University.
I The "categorizers" and "balancers" debated whether First Amendment
jurisprudence should employ rigid categories or flexible balancing tests. The former
opposed balancing as unprincipled and discretionary, while the latter saw in First
Amendment adjudication a necessary balancing among competing values. See
generallyWallace Mendelson, The FirstAmendment and the JudicialProcess: A Reply to Mr.
Franz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1964).
2 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REv.

22, 69 (1992).
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reasoning. It derives its criticism solely from habitual inconsistencies
plaguing the Supreme Court's elaboration of the analyzed doctrines.
The analysis reveals that, in the examined instances, judicial
reasoning purporting to justify a move from a bright-line rule into a
flexible standard is deeply flawed.
Hence, the call for the
preservation of the bright-line is less a call for judicial formalism than
a belief that the move to a flexible standard is unjustified.
This analysis and
criticism employs purpose-oriented
interpretation - an interpretation directed and constrained by the
purpose behind a directive's words. For example, whether a golf cart
is to be allowed in the park is determined by considering the purpose
behind the directive "no vehicles in the park." The directives
highlighted in this Article are not statutes, but constitutional
doctrines. Analysis of these doctrines is therefore based on an
interpretation of the purposes behind them. Consequently, the
"purposes" guiding this interpretation derive not from an
independent legislature, but from the very institution whose
interpretation is criticized in this Article, the United States Supreme
Court. It follows that the criticism must be based on the charge of
inconsistency on the part of the Court.
The Article provides an examination of three principal doctrines
in First Amendment jurisprudence: the content-based doctrine, the
doctrine of secondary effects, and the doctrine of expressive conduct.
The three doctrines are related. The content-based doctrine requires
courts to apply strict constitutional scrutiny to speech regulations
enacted by the government that are based on the content of the
speech. For example, a law regulating "communist" publications
must be examined with strict scrutiny. The secondary effects doctrine
exempts from strict scrutiny government regulations of speech that
are indeed based on the speech's content, but are not aimed at
suppressing speech. For example, a law regulating "pornographic"
movie theaters in an attempt to eliminate adjacent prostitution would
not be subject to strict scrutiny. Finally, the expressive-conduct
doctrine creates a constitutional test for regulations of conduct that
burden speech, but are not aimed at suppressing speech. For
example, the expressive-conduct doctrine would apply to the
prohibition of overnight stays in municipal parks when the
prohibition is applied to demonstrators seeking to present the plight
of the homeless through an overnight vigil in the Mall at Washington,
D.C.
The secondary-effects and the expressive-conduct doctrines are
conceptually equivalent, the former operating in the realm of
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"speech," the latter in the realm of "conduct." Both define the
appropriate constitutional tests for government regulations that
burden speech, but are not aimed at burdening it.
This Article advances two principal arguments.
First, the
doctrine of secondary effects obliterates the content-based doctrine,
the doctrine to which the doctrine of secondary effects was meant to
be a mere exception. Second, the doctrine of expressive conduct has
been misinterpreted by the Supreme Court.
I. CONTENT-BASED: DEFINITION
The content-based/content-neutral distinction emerged in its
clearest form during the eras of the Vietnam War and the civil rights
movement. This distinction came as a judicial response to the
growing social pressures of these eras and the mounting legislative
efforts to stem them. The basic idea underlying the distinction was
expressed in one of the earlier and oft-quoted formulations of the
content-based/content-neutral doctrine, Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley.' In Mosley, the Court stated that "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
4
content.,
The content-based/content-neutral distinction gave rise to
different constitutional standards of review for regulations that fell
within the two categories. In principle, content-based regulations
receive more rigorous constitutional scrutiny than do content-neutral
regulations. The determination of what constitutes a content-based
regulation is, therefore, of considerable importance. Among those
laws determined to be content-based are a law requiring the
surrender of royalties due a criminal for a work describing the crime,5
a law forbidding the posting of real estate "For Sale" signs,6 and a law
prohibiting corporate political expenditures on issues not directly
related to the corporation
Laws recognized as content-neutral
include an ordinance forbidding the distribution and sale of literature
from unlicensed booths at a state fair," an ordinance prohibiting all
3 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Id. at 95.
5 See Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.

105, 116 (1991).

6 See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977).
7 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978).

8 See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 64849 (1981).
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unauthorized posting of signs on public property, 9 and a New York City
ordinance requiring the use of city-provided sound systems and
technicians for performances in Central Park.'0
What distinguishes content-based laws from content-neutral laws
is not entirely clear. The Supreme Court has not articulated a
definition for the distinction, though various commentators have
attempted to formulate one. Professor Laurence Tribe describes the
distinction as one hinging on whether the regulation is "aim[ed] at
ideas or information," or, stated differently, whether the regulation is
"aimed at communicative impact."" A content-based regulation is
aimed at the "communicative impact" of speech, while a contentneutral regulation is aimed at the "noncommunicative" impact. What
exactly "aimed at" refers to is, however, unclear. In determining
whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral, the
Supreme Court consistently has refused to investigate the legislature's
purpose in enacting it.'2 In any case, as shall be addressed in greater
detail, all laws regulating speech may purport to be "aimed,"
ultimately, at noncommunicative impact.'
Professor John Hart Ely, discussing a Supreme Court opinion
categorizing a regulation as content-based, states: "[T]he critical
point in Cohen... is that the dangers on which the state relied were
dangers that flowed entirely from the communicative content of
Cohen's behavior. Had his audience been unable to read English,
9 See Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789,
804 (1984).
10 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CONSnTITUTONAL LAw § 12-2, at 789, 790 (2d ed.
1988).
12

See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1968) (refusing to inquire

into legislative motive for law banning the destruction of army draft card). In
refusing to speculate as to why Congress enacted the statute, the Court stated:
What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void
essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress
had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its
exact form if the same or another legislator made a "wiser" speech
about it.
Id. at 384; see also Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (declining
to refer to a powerful showing by the dissent indicating that a zoning ordinance was,
at least in part, motivated by a desire to restrict pornography).
1s
For a more detailed criticism of this definition, see Part III, infra. It appears
that this exact definition is the one adopted by the Supreme Court in its secondaryeffects analysis. As discussed below, the Court sought to characterize certain facially
content-based regulations as content-neutral on the grounds that they were not
aimed at the speech's communicative impact.
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there would have been no occasion for the regulation.", 4 This is an
illuminating statement. Unfortunately, the "danger" to which the
statement alludes is the conceptual equivalent of Professor Tribe's
"aimed at" inquiry. Moreover, "speech" need not be verbal to qualify
as content-based. The focus on verbal communication, however, is
telling. Most ideas likely to be recognized as "content" are verbal.
Content-based regulations of speech are those based on the
speech's content, that is, based on that which the speech is about its substance or its subject matter. The question of what constitutes
"content" is so all-encompassing as to elude any definition not equally
general. For any given book, the question "What is this book
'about'?" may be answered in almost an infinite number of ways.
Each of these ways corresponds to one meaningful aspect of our lives.
Content-based regulations of speech are those based on the
substance of the speech: its subject matter, its topic, or its meaning.
Content-neutral regulations of speech are all other regulations.
These regulations are not based on the speech's subject matter, but
rather on accidental attributes with which one can tamper without
altering the meaning being conveyed.
Given that the content-neutral/content-based classification
involves the attribution of meaning, the classification may apply
differently in different social environments. Additionally, because
content-based regulations of speech classify speech by reference to its
subject matter or conveyed meaning, to the extent that a certain
subject matter is identified with specific speakers, places, times, or
objects, a regulation may be classified as content-based if it classifies
speech by reference to such specific speakers, places, times, or objects.
Thus, a regulation prohibiting speeches by union leaders, speeches in
churches, speeches on the date of the Bolshevik Revolution, or
speeches by people donning military uniform, is, presumably, contentbased.
Content-based distinctions purport to identify the subject matter
upon which the regulation is based. Thus, a law exempting labor
disputes from a ban on residential picketing is content-based because
the law treats picketing differently based on the subject matter of the
demonstration (here, whether the picketing does or does not pertain

14 John Hart Ely, Rag Desecration: A Case Study
in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in FirstAmendment Anaysis, 88 HAv. L. REv. 1482, 1498 (1975) (discussing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing conviction of man who walked
through hallways of Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft")).
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to labor disputes). 5 A law banning the distribution of printed
materials at a state fair, on the other hand, is content-neutral, as it is
not based on the subject matter of the distributed material. 6
Such determinations, although for the most part obvious, may be
subject to controversy. A regulation setting a maximum decibel level
for music in a concert hall may strike most of us as content-neutral.
For most of us, the content of music consists of its tones, duration, and
tempo. Heavy metal music fans, however, may disagree. For them, the
meaning being conveyed consists, at least in part, of the large number
of decibels being used. Therefore, the regulation arguably may be
based on the music's subject matter. This attribution of meaning,
however, is not likely to receive acceptance. The expression contained
in the use7 of large numbers of decibels is considered to be devoid of
content.1

Whether a regulation classifies speech by reference to its subject
matter may, at times, be open to dispute. As a general rule, however,
the content-based/content-neutral distinction is not subject to much
controversy. The distinction is intuitively clear - or was intuitively
clear until the Court launched the doctrine of "secondary effects."
II. THE DOCTRINE OF SECONDARY EFFECTS: DESCRIPTION

Thus far, this Article has defined the meaning of the term
content-based by reference to the meaning of the word "content." The
modem secondary-effects doctrine defines content-based by shifting
the focus to the word "based." In Young v. American Mini Theaters,
Inc.'8s and Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court held
that regulations that are facially content-based are to be classified as
content-neutral if they are not aimed at the communicative effect of
the speech, but rather at its secondary effects.
Young, the case
introducing this secondary-effects analysis, upheld a zoning ordinance
that required the dispersing of adult theaters. 20 The Court recognized
the ordinance, which identified adult movie theaters by reference to

See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980).
See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648-49.
17 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 803 (finding that a New York City
ordinance regulating
noise levels for performances in Central Park was content-neutral).
18 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
19 475 U.S. 41
(1986).
20 See Young, 427 U.S. at 72-73.
The ordinance in question stated that
"[s]pecifically, an adult theater may not be located within 1,000 feet of any two other
'regulated uses' or within 500 feet of a residential area." Id. at 52 (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion).
:5
6
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the content of the films exhibited, as facially content-based.2" The
city, however, justified the ordinance as a means to combat the high
concentration of crime and the accompanying depreciation in
property values that, arguably, resulted from the presence of such
establishments. Justice Stevens's plurality opinion analyzed the
ordinance under a standard of scrutiny appropriate for contentneutral regulations, explaining that "the regulation of the places
where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is unaffected by
whatever social, political, or philosophical message the film may be
intended to communicate.""2 The Justice elaborated:
The Common Council's determination was that a concentration
of "adult" movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and
become a focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to
theaters showing other types of films. It is this secondary effect
which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the
dissemination of "offensive" speech.23
Justice Stevens relied, in part, on the sexual nature of the speech.
Justice Powell agreed with the majority's standard of
constitutional scrutiny, 25 but refused to rely on the sexual nature of
the speech. 6
In a concurrence often quoted by subsequent
secondary-effects opinions, the Justice stated: "We have here merely
a decision by the city to treat certain movie theaters differently
because they have markedly different effects upon their
surroundings. 2 7 The opinions of both Justice Stevens and Justice
See id. at 71-72. The ordinance was content-based because
[t] he classification of a theater as "adult" is expressly predicated on the
character of the motion pictures which it exhibits. If the theater is
used to present 'material distinguished or characterized by an
emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to "Specified
Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas," it is an adult
establishment.
I& at 53.
21

22

1&at 70.

Id. at 71 n.34.
See id. at 70-71. Justice Stevens stated:
[Elven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate
the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably
artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type
of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the
interest in untrammeled political debate.
Id. at 70.
25 See id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell noted:
"In these
circumstances, it is appropriate to analyze the permissibility of Detroit's action under
the four-part test of United States v. O'Brien." Id.
See Young, 427 U.S. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
2
Id. at 82 n.6.
2

24
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Powell relied on the purpose of the legislature to hold that the
ordinance was aimed at noncommunicative elements of the speech.
Renton involved a zoning ordinance similar to the one in Young.
The Court upheld the ordinance, reiterating the secondary-effects
analysis. 29 The dissent, reviewing the legislative history of the
ordinance, adduced strong evidence showing that the ordinance was
meant to suppress the expression of sexual speech.3s The Court
refused to invalidate the ordinance because of "an alleged illicit
legislative motive.""' Instead, the majority relied on a finding by the
district court that the "predominant intent" behind the ordinance
was "unrelated to the suppression of free expression."32
The
28

See id. at 55, 75. In the plurality opinion, Justice Stevens noted:

In the opinion of urban planners and real estate experts who
supported the ordinances, the location of several such businesses in the
same neighborhood tends to attract an undesirable quantity and
quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an
increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and
businesses to move elsewhere.
Id. at 55 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). In concurrence, Justice Powell declared that
"[tihe purpose of preventing the deterioration of commercial neighborhoods was
certainly within the concept of the public welfare that defines the limits of the police
power ....The Common Council did not inversely zone adult theaters in an effort
to protect citizens against the content of adult movies." Id. at 75, 82 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
29 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. The Court determined that "the
Renton ordinance is
aimed not at the content of the films shown at 'adult motion picture theaters,' but
rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community." Id.
30 See id. at 58-59, 61
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in dissent,
recognized:
Shortly after this lawsuit commenced, the Renton City Council
amended the ordinance, adding a provision explaining that its
intention in adopting the ordinance had been "to promote the City of
Renton's great interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its
neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life
through effective land use planning ....
* * . In addition to the suspiciously coincidental timing of the
amendment, many of the City Council's "findings" do not relate to
legitimate land-use concerns. As the Court of Appeals observed,
"[b]oth the magistrate and the district court recognized that many of
the stated reasons for the ordinance were no more than expressions of
dislike for the subject matter."
In sum, the circumstances here strongly suggest that the ordinance
was designed to suppress expression ....
Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
51 Id. at 48.
32 Id.
In making the determination that the ordinance was not intended to
suppress free speech, but rather to prevent the effects that such speech (the showing
of adult films) has on the surrounding community, the Court stated:
The District Court's finding as to "predominant" intent, left
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ordinance was thus classified as content-neutral."s
This contentneutral classification resonated oddly. In addition to the legislative
history being rather contradictory to the district court's finding that
the predominant intent of the ordinance did not relate to the
restraint of free expression, the Court specifically eschewed the
"guesswork" involved in investigating legislative motives. Thus, the
Court refused to consider legislative motives while clearly relying on
them.
Quite predictably, the claim of secondary effects subsequently
has proven popular with government lawyers defending allegedly
content-based regulations of speech.34 Boos v. Barr 3 5 involved an
ordinance that prohibited the display of signs that tended to bring
"public disrepute" to a foreign government. The ordinance also
undisturbed by the Court of Appeals, is more than adequate to
establish that the city's pursuit of its zoning interests here was
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The ordinance by its
terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade,
maintain property values, and generally "protec[t] and preserv[e] the
quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the
quality of urban life," not to suppress the expression of unpopular
views.
Id.

See id. The Supreme Court often refers to content-neutral regulations as time,
place, and manner regulations. On their terms, these regulate the circumstances
surrounding the speech rather than the speech itself. Accordingly, a law prohibiting
speaker-carrying vehicles from emitting loud and raucous sounds, as in Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), or a law prohibiting the posting of signs on utility polls, as
in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), are both
time, place, and manner regulations because they merely regulate the means of
expression. That so-called time, place, and manner regulations must be contentneutral is clear. Almost all of the regulations implicating First Amendment protections
are regulations regulating the time, place, or manner of the speech. See, e.g., Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 (1972) (forbidding picketing from taking
place within a specified distance of a school during school hours, except that picketing
in connection with a school labor dispute is allowed); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726, 731 (1978) (limiting the broadcasting of "sensitive language" to after-hours);
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 59-60 (1970) (banning the "unauthorized
wearing of American military uniforms in a manner calculated to discredit the armed
forces"). This did not prevent all three from being recognized as content-based. To
categorize a regulation as one of time, place, or manner is to state that it is based only
on the time, place, or manner in which the speech is conveyed; that it is, in other
words, content-neutral. The Court has stated on numerous occasions that time, place,
and manner regulations must be content-neutral. It is conceivable that this explicit
requirement has prevented the Court from characterizing the secondary-effects
ordinances as time, place, and manner regulations.
34 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867-68
(1997); Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S.
43, 53 n.11 (1994); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992).
s5 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
s
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prohibited the congregation of three or more persons within fivehundred feet of a foreign embassy.m The government claimed that
the ordinance was content-neutral because it was aimed at the
secondary effects of the speech and not at its expression." In the
course of its opinion, the Court categorized the "public disrepute"
provision as content-based, and the "congregation" provision as
content-neutral.'"
In Boos, six Justices implied that the secondary-effects analysis is
appropriate outside the context of sexual speech. 9
Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Scalia, stated, in a passage
often quoted in subsequent cases, that "[1]isteners' reactions to
speech are not the type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in
Renton."' o A regulation targeting "the direct impact of a particular
category of speech, not a secondary feature that happens to be
associated with that type of speech," is not a regulation of secondary
effects.' In subsequent cases, the Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed its
'
commitment to the doctrine of "secondary effects. 42
3
37
8

See id. at 315.
See id. at319.
Seeid. at 321.

39 See id. at 320-21, 339.

See id. at 321.

Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. The "direct impact" standard was attacked by the partial
concurrence as untenable. See id. at 335 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). The Court previously adopted a "direct-indirect impact"
distinction in the context of the Commerce Clause and eventually abandoned that
proposition as unsound. See id. at 336 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) ("[T]he Renton approach saddles courts with a fuzzy
distinction between the secondary and direct effects of speech, a distinction that is
likely to prove just as unworkable as other direct/indirect distinctions in
constitutional jurisprudence have proved."); see also Susan H. Williams, Content
Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 630 n.55 (1991).
Williams writes:
The number of intermediate links in the causal chain connecting
speech to any type of harm is almost infinitely malleable; the number is
entirely a matter of how one chooses to describe them. In addition,
unless there is some qualitative difference in the type of causal
connection, there is no reason - in terms of the purposes of free
speech or the dangers of content discrimination -why a longer causal
chain should leave the government freer to regulate based on the
resulting harm than would a shorter one.
41

Id.

42 See, e.g., R.A.V.,
505 U.S. at 377, 389 ("Another valid basis for according
differential treatment to even a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is
that the subclass happens to be associated with particular 'secondary effects' of the
speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without reference to the content of the...
speech'") (internal citations omitted); Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 ("'Regulations that
focus on the direct impact of speech on its audience' are not properly analyzed
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The Court made clear in Boos and in subsequent opinions that
the basic requirement of the secondary-effects classification is that
the regulation involved does not target the communicative element
of the speech. Secondary-effects regulations are "regulations that
apply to a particular category of speech because the regulatory targets
happen to be associated with that type of speech." Such regulations,
even if their operation hinges on the content of the speech, are not
content-based, but instead are content-neutral. Thus, "based" is not
the equivalent of "in reference to." Rather, "based" is the equivalent
of "aimed at." Content-aimed regulations are the so-called contentbased regulations.
Who, then, must aim the regulation at the content of speech?
Apparently not the legislature, for the Court has specifically rejected
inquiry into legislative purpose. Regardless, it is of little help to know
that
secondary-effects
regulations
are
those
aimed
at
noncommunicative evils. All laws regulating speech are, to some
extent, aimed at noncommunicative evils - or at least may claim to be
as such. A regulation prohibiting the showing of a film glorifying
adultery is, ultimately, aimed at preventing the act of adultery."
Likewise, a law forbidding criticism of the government is ultimately
aimed at preventing the replacement of that government.
The government itself rarely, if ever, attempts to justify its
regulation by reference to the "communicative impact" of the speech.
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,5 the city claimed that the
ordinance, which exempted labor picketing from a ban on picketing in
the vicinity of schools, was aimed at preventing violent picketing from
disrupting school operations." Labor picketing, it was claimed, was
not likely to turn disruptive.
Similarly, in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,"
the city claimed that an ordinance banning the display of nudity in
drive-in theaters with screens visible from public streets was a traffic
regulation. 49 In Simon & Schuster v. Members of New York State Crime

under Renton.") (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
43 Boos, 485 U.S. at 320.
See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (invalidating
a
New York film-licensing law pursuant to which a license was denied for the
distribution of "Lady Chatterley's Lover").
408 U.S. 92 (1972)

4

See id. at 100.

47 See
id.
4

422 U.S. 205 (1975).
See id. at 214.
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Victims Boart ° the invalidated law, which required the surrender of
royalties due a criminal for a work describing the crime, was aimed at
preventing criminals from further benefiting from their crimes.Y'
And in Arkansas Writer's Project Inc. v. Ragland,5' a tax on generalinterest magazines, with exemptions for magazines dealing with
religious issues and sports (among certain other topics), was aimed at
increasing revenues." What, then, distinguishes secondary effects
from all other noncommunicative effects?
One explanation argues that secondary effects are those harms
that flow from the regulated expression without having the causal
chain between the speech and its effect pass through the mind of the
audience.M Professor Susan H. Williams writes:
In what sense is economic and physical deterioration a
"secondary" effect distinct from the effect of offense to viewers or
listeners? Secondary effects are, in fact, noncommunicative
effects arising from the speech as a physical event in the world,
not from the communicative aspect of the speech. That is, the
causal chain connecting speech to a secondary effect does not
include a link that takes place in the mind of a recipient of the
speech. Communication involves the transmission of a message
of some kind from one person to another. If the harm at which
the government is aiming will only come about if some message is
in fact received by a listener, then the harm is a communicative
one. Offense is, of course, a communicative harm. The harm of
offense can only occur if someone in fact receives a message from
A drop in property values is, however, a
the speech.
noncommunicative harm. Even if all of the people who actually
entered the "adult" theater were deaf and blind, and therefore
unable to receive any message from the speech, the property
values in the neighborhood of the theater would still drop as long
as the business continued to operate.55
Somewhat similar is Professor Ely's discussion of a comparable
requirement in the O'Brien test,s that the "government interests [be]
unrelated to the suppression of free expression" in regulations of

50

51
52

53

502 U.S. 105 (1991).
See id. at 108.
481 U.S. 221 (1987).
See id. at 231.
SeeWilliams, supra note 41, at 631.

55 Id.

The O'Brien test appeared in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
The test articulates a standard of review for regulations of "expressive conduct." See
text accompanying notes 56-57 infra for an explanation of the O'Brien test.
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expressive conduct: 57
The reference of O'Brien's second criterion is therefore not to the
ultimate interest to which the state is able to point, for that will
always be unrelated to expression, but rather to the causal
connection the state asserts. If, for example, the state asserts an
interest in discouraging riots, the Court will ask why that interest
is implicated in the case at bar. If the answer is (as in such cases it
will likely have to be) that the danger was created by what the
defendant was saying, the state's interest is not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression within the meaning of O'Brien's
criterion ....The critical question would therefore seem to be
whether the harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that
grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating, and
more particularly out of the way people can be expected to react
to his message, or rather would arise even if the defendant's
conduct had no communicative significance whatever.5
Thus, if a regulation is aimed at remedying evils that are not the
consequence of the audience's absorption of the idea, then the
regulation is one of secondary effects. These explanations are derived
directly from the articulations of the Supreme Court.
IV. CRITICISM OF EXPLANATION I
One problem with these formulations is that it is not clear how,
and by whom, the "purpose," "aim," "interest," 'Justification,"" or
"harm that the state is seeking to avert" is to be determined. Professor
Ely's formulation appears to dodge this difficulty by focusing on the
interest claimed by the government. Such an approach has much to
commend it, for a clearly bogus or pretextual government claim is
likely to fail even a lax constitutional test. It must still be determined,
however, what harms grow out of the communicated ideas and what
harms do not. O'Brien involved the prosecution of a man accused of
the willful destruction of an army draft card. O'Brien burned his draft
card in a demonstration protesting the Vietnam War. 60 The
government claimed that the law was meant to ensure the efficiency of
See infraSection IX for a definition of "expressive conduct."
Ely, supra note 14, at 1497. The similarity of the issues and the nearness of the
terms the Court used in both cases suggest that the Court saw in its secondary-effects
cases the "speech" equivalent of O'Brien's "incidental effects."
57

59 The RA.V. Court noted that "[a]nother valid basis for according differential

treatment to even a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is that the
subclass happens to be associated with particular 'secondary effects' of the speech, so
that the regulation is 'justified without reference to the content of the ...speech.'"
R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 389 (citations omitted).
6D See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
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Professor Ely adduces this claim as a
drafting operations.6
paradigmatic justification unrelated to the suppression of expression:
The interests upon which the government relied were interests,
having mainly to do with the preservation of selective service
records, that would have been equally threatened had O'Brien's
destruction of his draft card totally lacked communicative
significance - had he, for example, used it to start a campfire for
a solitary cookout or dropped it in his garbage disposal for a
lark.62
Professor Ely's characterization of the government interest in
O'Brien may be accurate, but it tells us nothing of the causal chain
between the act of communication and the harm that the state seeks to
remedy. For example, the state could have been faced with drafting
difficulties caused by the destruction of draft cards only because a great
number of draft cards were burned in mass demonstrations. Could we
then say that the harm did not grow out of the communicative impact
of O'Brien's expression? In Young and Renton, the Court apparently
believed that the harms the government sought to remedy did not
grow out of the communicated ideas. Thus crime, prostitution, and
property devaluation in the vicinity of adult theaters were not the
effects of conveying a sexual idea to an audience. This determination,
however, must have involved an impossible investigation into the mind
of the audience. Was the patron attending the theater because he was
sexually excited, or was he sexually excited because he was attending
the theater? This same investigation would be required in our
hypothetical O'Brien case: Were people burning their draft cards
because of the message conveyed by O'Brien, or were they attending
the demonstration in order to burn their draft cards in the first place?
An additional problem with the noncommunicative impact
analysis and its "causal chain" formulation is that it flies in the face of
Supreme Court decisions such as Simon & Schuster v. Members of the
New York State Crime Victims Board.6 That case involved a law ordering
the surrender of royalties paid to a criminal for a work describing the
crime. The Court recognized several purposes that the law meant to
serve, including the prevention of criminals benefiting from crime,
and providing compensation for crime victims.64 The government
disavowed any interest in suppressing descriptions of crime, and the

61

See id. at 369-70, 386.

62

Ely, supra note 14, at 1498.
502 U.S. 105 (1991).

64

See id. at l08, 116.
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Court accepted this disavowal. 8 Thus, neither of the law's purposes
were aimed at the so-called "communicative impact" of the burdened
speech, yet the law was held to be content-based."
V. SECONDARY EFFECTS: EXPLANATION II
What, then, makes one regulation a regulation of secondary
effects and another a regulation of primary effects? The answer may
be simple. The Justices of the Supreme Court take it upon themselves
to decide what government purpose underlies the law and then to
determine whether such government purpose is acceptable. Perhaps
the most straightforward secondary-effects analysis is found in Justice
Souter's concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,67 in which Justice
Souter opted to uphold the prosecution of nude-dancing
establishments under public-nudity laws. The Justice asserted (1)
that the purpose of the challenged regulation may be determined by
the Court without reference to the legislature's motive; (2) that, in
the Justice's opinion, the purpose involved was not the suppression of
sexual speech, but rather the control of crime-related secondary
effects; and (3) that this purpose was sufficient for upholding the
statute under the standard appropriate for content-neutral
regulations. 68 Indeed, this is the gist of the secondary-effects analysis
With little ceremony, the Justices
for regulations of speech.
transformed the challenged regulations from the grim realm of the
content-based into the merry universe of the content-neutral. This
explanation may also account for the curious correlation between the
recognition of an ordinance as one of secondary effects and its
a level of
survival of content-neutral constitutional scrutiny 65

67
68

Seeid. at ll7.
See id. at 108.
501 U.S. 560 (1991).
See id. at 582-83. Justice Souter asserted:
It is, of course, true that this justification has not been articulated by
Indiana's Legislature or by its courts .... I think that we need not so
limit ourselves in identifying the justification for the legislation at issue

here ....
...Our appropriate focus is not an empirical inquiry into the actual
intent of the enacting legislature, but rather the existence or not of a
current governmental interest in the service of which the challenged

application of the statute may be constitutional ....

In my view, the

interest asserted by petitioners in preventing prostitution, sexual

assault, and other criminal activity, although presumably not a
justification for all applications of the statute, is sufficient under O'Brien
to justify the State's enforcement of the statute against the type of adult
entertainment at issue here.
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6
scrutiny proven fatal for numerous less fortunate regulations.

VI. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE DOCTRINE OF SECONDARY EFFECrS

Facially content-based, secondary-effects regulations of the type
upheld in Renton and Young purport to identify a harm that, as a rule,
accompanies but is not caused by the expression of a certain subject
matter.70 Arguably, this is not impossible - but it is highly unlikely.
Imagine a regulation barring conventions addressing the financial
markets, on the assumption that such conventions draw violent crime
due to the affluence of those attending. We still must assume that the
attendees' affluence is not itself causally related to the subject matter of
the conventions.
That the Court attempts to identify secondary-effects regulations
and assign them a different level of scrutiny is understandable in view
of the principle underlying the content-based/content-neutral
That principle is best explained as follows:
distinction.
"[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views."7 The distinction expresses
hostility toward government control of public opinion; yet as long as
the government's purpose is unrelated to the suppression of the
communicated ideas, no occasion for the distinction arises.
This claim is misleading for two reasons. First, the claim is
meaningless for First Amendment purposes. The government is,
without doubt, more willing to regulate secondary effects at the
expense of speech it does not favor than at the expense of speech that
it does. (Also, the idea that a regulation has but one "purpose," let
alone an identifiable one, is highly questionable.) Second, the claim
that facially content-based regulations of secondary effects, as the
Court defines them, are in any way distinguishable from other contentbased regulations, is mistaken.
The secondary-effects doctrine suffers from two serious defects.
First, the doctrine obliterates and is hostile toward the very purpose
69 See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454

(1995) (finding that a subsection of the Ethics in Government Act that prohibited
receipt of honoraria by government employees was content-neutral and violated the
First Amendment); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (declaring that a
statute prohibiting protests in the Supreme Court building or on its grounds to be
content-neutral and unconstitutional).
70 The harm identified by certain speech in secondary-effects
regulations is best
described as a secondary feature that "happen [s] to be associated with that type of
speech." Boos, 485 U.S. at 320 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96
(1972).
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of the content-based/content-neutral distinction.
Second, the
secondary-effects doctrine has no adequate explanation and is
therefore judicial reasoning at its weakest. Subsection A elaborates
on the former claim; subsection B on the latter.
A. Defect One: Hostility Toward the Purposeof the ContentBased/Content-NeutralDistinction
The content-based/content-neutral distinction is meant to
encumber government attempts to suppress speech that the
government does not favor. The distinction absolves courts of the risky
burden of separating the ideas that the government attempts to
regulate for the common good from those that the government
attempts to regulate to control public opinion - or, still worse, from
regulation of ideas that courts refuse to accept as supporting the
common good. Thus, when the regulation is content-based, strict
scrutiny applies. The substance of the content itself is irrelevant. The
facially content-based, secondary-effects analysis eliminates this virtue.
The facially content-based, secondary-effects analysis forces courts
to inquire into the purpose of the regulation. Presumably, if the
purpose is to control the exposure of the public to ideas, the
regulation is content-based. If the purpose is unrelated to the
communicative effects of the speech, the regulation is content-neutral.
But this is the same investigation into the purpose behind regulations
that the content-based/content-neutral distinction sought to avoid.
The secondary-effects analysis simply eliminates the essence of this
distinction.
Yet the criticism need not stop here. That courts are absolved
from determining whether a regulation advances the common good is
significant. The doctrine of content-based characterization escapes an
investigation into both the consciousness and the subconsciousness of
the government agents effecting the regulation.
Courts may
implement regimes of oppression as effectively as any other
government body. It is little comfort, if any comfort at all, that the
judiciary, and not the legislature, is now free to allow content-based
legislation to stand with only cursory constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court's secondary-effects analysis not only
disembowels the content-based doctrine, but the Court uses the
analysis to bring about the very menace that the doctrine sought to
prevent. While the doctrine was adopted as a manifestation of the
widely accepted idea that the government may not suppress speech
merely because the government disapproves of it, the government now
uses the doctrine to do just that. Legislation "liked" by the courts
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receives more lenient constitutional scrutiny and is deemed not
content-based, while regulation "disliked" by the courts receives
exacting scrutiny and is deemed content-based.n
B. Defect Two: Lack of Adequate Explanation and FlawedJudicial
Reasoning
One reason for the existence of judicial review is that courts,
unlike legislative or executive bodies, are explicitly bound by
purported "rational principles." A "rule of law" is, by definition,
neither arbitrary nor capricious. This means that the law must be
knowable. That the law is knowable allows it, among other things, to
change through the legislative process. All of these propositions, so
fundamental to the system of representative government, depend on
the rationality of the adjudication process. Courts do not merely issue
verdicts. Courts are obliged to explain those verdicts. Court opinions
are meant to guarantee the rationality of the system. Thus when the
explanation accompanying a verdict is faulty or untenable, the rule of
law is undermined at its very foundation.
When the Supreme Court uses distinctions or classifications that
lack adequate explanation, the Court fails to fulfill its institutional
obligations. The secondary-effects doctrine suffers from such a flaw. It
attempts to draw an inexplicable distinction between various
regulations of speech.
7
It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter, whether
the Court applies strict or nominal constitutional scrutiny. But if the idea underlying
the content-based doctrine still holds true - and it is possible to believe that it does
not - then the Court (as the cat in charge of the milk) should not have unbridled
discretion to ignore the practical implications of that idea. And if the Court does
decide to ignore these implications, the Court should, at the very least, explain why
the idea should be applicable to one set of cases but not to another.
73 The "balancers" in the categorizers/balancers debate maintained
that
doctrinal categorizations in First Amendment jurisprudence would lead to a less
rational process. Compare Mendelson, supra note 1, at 481 ("The need for judicial
balancing, I suggest, results from the imperfection of mundane law. In a better
world, no doubt, clear and precise legal rules would anticipate all possible
contingencies.") with Ely, supra note 14, at 1501 ("[B]alancing tests inevitably
become intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing the
balancing - or if not that, at least with the relative confidence or paranoia of the age

in which they are doing it .

. . .").

When Mendelson, in his vehement defense of

balancing, asserts that "[s]urely the choice is simply this: shall the balancing be done
'intuitively' or rationally; covertly or out in the open?," he adduced that Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), is "a classic example of covert, and probably
'intuitive,' balancing." Mendelson, supra note 1, at 481-82. It is interesting that the
distinction on which Di Santo was decided is identical with the one that the Court has
recently articulated in its secondary-effects opinions:
There [in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania] the Court held invalid a state
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74
The plurality opinion in Young v. American Mini, Theatres, Inc.
characterized sexually explicit speech as entitled to less-than-full First
Amendment protection and, hence, accounted for the absence of strict
scrutiny by referring to the sexual nature of the burdened speech.75 As
a result, several commentators and at least two Justices believed that
the secondary-effects analysis was, or ought to have been, restricted to
sexually explicit speech. 76 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this
claim in subsequent cases. This rejection had two consequences. First,
the rejection impaired the prospects of legislative action aimed at
protecting sexually explicit speech. Second, the rejection opened the
door for minimal scrutiny of mysteriously chosen, facially contentbased regulations of speech.
This is the point at which both lines of criticisms merge: The
secondary-effects analysis offered by the Court is, in fact, an
unprincipled exception and nothing more. If it were capable of
being explained, then both critiques would be misdirected. In other
words, if regulations not aimed at the speech's communicative
element were both distinguishable from other regulations of speech
and characterized by a reduced danger of government oppression,
then the secondary-effects doctrine was an admirable refinement of
the manifestation of the idea that governments are predisposed to
suppress speech that they find unfavorable, yet which may be
valuable. But, as it stands today, the secondary-effects doctrine has no
such adequate explanation.
Nothing more than a bare
determination by nonelected government officials that the purpose
of a particular regulation is acceptable distinguishes secondary-effects
regulations from other regulations of speech.
An underlying assumption in this Article is that certain doctrinal
distinctions, the content-based/content-neutral distinction among

regulation of commerce as a "direct burden" - and that is virtually all
there was in the opinion. No observer could tell what interests were
weighed against what. Ostensibly the Court merely applied a wellknown rule of law. But who outside the Court could know, and thus
appraise, the decisive considerations that marked the burden in
question as "direct" rather than "indirect"?
Id. at 482.
74 427
7

76

U.S. 50 (1976).

See id. at 70.
See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 11, § 12-3, at 798-99 n.17 ("[T]he Renton view will

likely prove to be an aberration limited to the context of sexually explicit
materials."); Boos, 485 U.S. 312, 334-35 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I write
separately ... to object to Justice O'Connor's assumption that the Renton analysis
applies not only outside the context of businesses purveying sexually explicit
materials but even to political speech.").
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them, flow from propositions that may be articulated. If one agrees
with those propositions, the use of such distinctions can be more or
less correct.
The proposition underlying the content-based
characterization is that the "government may not grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views."" This
proposition, in turn, flows from other propositions, such as the
proposition that government control over public opinion may be
inimical to the public good.
The Supreme Court's recent use of the content-based/contentneutral distinction is incorrect; in other words, it does not accord with
the Court's own understanding of the foundation for that distinction.
As defined above, content-based regulations are those that classify
speech by reference to its subject matter or conveyed meaning.7
Given the above analysis, the term "content-based" should be restored
to its clear meaning. "Based" is neither "aimed" nor 'Justified." A
regulation that is based on the content of the speech is a regulation that
classifies speech by reference to the speech's content. There is, of
course, nothing new in this understanding. As the dissent in Boos v.
Barry notes, this was understood, at least by some, as the very meaning
of the term before the secondary-effects doctrine made its debutL
In Turner BroadcastingSystem Inc. v. FCC,* four Justices supported
the argument that a regulation requiring television cable operators to
carry local television stations is content-based.8'
Applying the
77
78

Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96.
See supraPart I.
See Boos, 485 U.S. at 336 (Brennan,J., dissenting). The dissent noted:
The traditional approach sets forth a bright-line rule: any restriction
on speech, the application of which turns on the content of the speech,
is a content-based restriction regardless of the motivation that lies
behind it. That, to my mind, has always been implicit in the fact that
we term the test a "content-based" test rather than a "motivation-based"
test.

Id.

so520 U.S. 180 (1997).

S See id. at 233-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In determining
that the regulation
at issue was content-based, Justice O'Connor stated:
Indeed, the only justification advanced by the parties for furthering
this interest is heavily content based. It is undisputed that the
broadcast stations protected by must-carry are the "marginal" stations
within a given market .... [A]ppellees emphasize that the must-carry
rules are necessary to ensure that broadcast stations maintain "diverse,"
"quality" programming that is "responsive" to the needs of the local
community .... Must-carry is thus justified as a way of preserving
viewers' access to a Spanish or Chinese language station or of
preventing an independent station from adopting a home-shopping
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definition of the term "content-based" to the must-carry provision
challenged in Turner, the Justices' assertion appears difficult to
sustain. The regulation makes no reference to the subject matter of
the broadcasts. Nor is the peculiarly local nature of these stations
linked to such certain subject matter.
Earlier, in Forsyth County, Georgia v. National Movement,82 the
Court classified as content-based an ordinance adjusting parade
licensing fees to the expected costs of policing the parade.8 3 The
decision is, in fact, an endorsement of disparate-impact analysis in
content-based classifications." The Forsyth County decision is another
departure from the facial meaning of the term "content-based." This
is not to say that regulations with disparate impact warrant an easily
surmountable constitutional analysis. But if facially content-neutral
regulations that have a disparate impact constitute a danger to
freedom of speech, then the Court should develop a doctrine to
address such danger and should give that doctrine a name. Naming
that doctrine "content-based" is not only linguistically wrong, but also
misleading. I do not suggest that the Supreme Court should abandon
the content-based/content-neutral doctrine altogether. The only
suggestion is that the Justices subvert the Court's institutional role
when it does away with a doctrine while purporting to uphold it.
VII. EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT: DEFINITION

Implicit in the Court's First Amendment analyses, and at times
made explicit through the expressive-conduct test, is the dichotomy
between actions" regarded as "communicative" and those regarded as
"pure conduct." This dichotomy excludes a large variety of actions
(car theft, for example) from the kindly protections of the First
Amendment. A second dichotomy, which draws a distinction within
the realm of communicative action, exists between "speech" and
"expressive conduct." As discussed above, a further division taking

format.
Id.

505 U.S. 123 (1992).
See id. at 126-27, 137.
84 The disparate-impact analysis concerns regulations that, although facially
content-neutral, have a greater impact on a particular type of speech or speakers.
Thus, a law prohibiting the distribution of leaflets in public streets may particularly
burden indigent speakers and may therefore, under a disparate-impact analysis, be
82

classified as "content-based."

See Williams, supra note 41, at 705-14, for a

commentator advocating the categorization of disparate impact regulations as
content-based.
85 The term "actions," as used here, includes the use of
language.
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place within the realm of speech is the content-based/content-neutral
division.8 6
Once an action is deemed communicative (a decision that this
Article does not investigate), it is classified as either speech or
expressive conduct, and further analysis depends on this
classification. 7 To classify a regulation as a regulation of expressive
conduct does not mean that it regulates nonverbal expression. This
has been recognized in a variety of cases that analyzed regulations of
nonverbal communications under a strict scrutiny standard, a standard
different from and more exacting than the one designed for expressive
conduct. For example, in Eyznoznik v. JacksonvilleP, the Court, treating
the ordinance as a restriction on speech, invalidated a ban on the
display of nudity in drive-in theaters.' Likewise, in RA. V v. City of St.
Paur, the Court categorized the burning of a cross as speech.91 In
Buckley v. Valed", the Court recognized political expenditures as a
form of speech. 3
Regulations of expressive conduct are distinguishable from other
regulations of speech because the government is likely to have
legitimate reasons for the regulations of expressive conduct that are
unrelated to regulating expression. This parallels the secondary-effects
rationale. Therefore, a regulation of expressive conduct must be (1) a
regulation regulating activity not used predominantly for expression,
and (2) a regulation that is not aimed at the conduct because it is used
for expression. Laws regulating communicative action that fail to
accord with the above requirements should be classified as regulations
of speech. Subsection A of this discussion analyzes the first prong of
this test, while subsection B analyzes the second.

Speech refers to the prosecuted action; expressive conduct and the contentbased/content-neutral division implicates the directive under which the action is
prosecuted.
87 The
standard test for so-called "regulations of expressive conduct" was
announced in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). This test requires that
the purpose of the scrutinized regulation be unrelated to the suppression of
86

expression. See id. at 384-85.
88 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
89 See id. at 206-07.
0 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
91
93

See id. at 379-81.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See id. at 14-15.
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Regulations of Activity Not Used Predominantlyfor Expression

The first requirement, which is only implicit in the Court's
reasoning, deals with the basic distinction between speech and
expressive conduct. The requirement draws our attention to the fact
that speech is not merely verbal and that verbal activities are not always
speech. All activities that are used predominantly for expressive or
communicative purposes, such as speaking and writing, should be
classified as speech.
Individuals engage in such activities
predominantly for expressive purposes, but they are undertaken for
nonexpressive purposes as well. I may, for example, speak in order to
check my recording equipment, sing in the shower for the sheer
pleasure of hearing my voice, or write to remind myself of the
groceries I need.94 But, again, speaking and writing are predominantly
used for expressive purposes.
This definition of "speech" obviously includes the use of symbols.
Symbols, like words, are used primarily for the purpose of expressing
ideas. Thus, laws regulating the displaying of the swastika, 9 the use of
a red flag,96 or the playing of national anthems97 are regulations of
speech. Speech also includes such activities as picketing and parading.
Speech does not include activities engaged in primarily for
nonexpressive purposes, such as sleeping in the park. In short, when
the regulation regulates activity that is engaged in predominantly for
communication purposes, the danger of government control over
public opinion is sufficient to justify its further categorization into
content-based or content-neutral, and, in the former case, subjecting
it to strict constitutional scrutiny. This "predominantly expressive"
test is not entirely unambiguous. Assuming the intelligibility of the
expressive conduct/pure conduct distinction, however, such a
distinction is a relatively clear measure of categorization. 9
B. Regulations Not Aimed at Conduct
The second requirement, that the regulation not be aimed at the
conduct merely because it is used for expression, classifies a regulation
Communication with oneself is, arguably, excluded from First Amendment
protection.
95 See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380.
94

96 See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361, 368-69 (1931).
97

See Williams, supra note 41, at 644 n.12 (hypothesizing that the playing of a

national anthem is an act of expression).
98 It is necessary, of course, to define the term "communicative" or "expressive"
in clearer terms. As noted above, however, this definition is beyond the scope of this
Article, although much in this Article depends on it.
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as a regulation of speech.if it regulates conduct (or an activity engaged
in predominantly for noncommunicative purposes) because that
conduct is used for communicative purposes. If the law is aimed at
regulating expression, it matters little whether the expression is
conveyed through means not predominantly used for expression. The
First Amendment's lenient treatment of rules regulating conduct, in
contrast to rules regulating speech, has no justification when the
conduct is regulated because it is used for the expression of ideas.
This requirement appears, in a version different from the one
proposed here, in O'Brien's requirement that the regulation not be
related to the suppression of expression.
This definition, however, appears to entangle the observer in the
same purpose inquiry vehemently criticized above. Because such
purpose inquiries tend to dissolve into unworkable investigations of
motivation, or, worse, into unreasoned discretionary decisions, a
determination that the regulation is aimed at the conduct merely
because it is used for expression must be limited to two possibilities.
Therefore, a regulation is said to be aimed at the conduct because it is
used for expression if (1) it explicitly refers to such expression or,
stated differently, is facially aimed at expression; or (2) selective
enforcement is shown so that the regulation against the conduct is
enforced only when it is used as a means of expression. Any regulation
that accords with the above criteria must be classified as a regulation of
speech and not a regulation of expressive conduct.
Under possibility one, a law prohibiting the destruction of army
draft cards in anti-wardemonstrations is not a regulation of conduct, but
a regulation of speech. 99 Under possibility two, if a law banning
overnight sleep in the park is enforced only against those wishing to
convey the plight of homelessness through such overnight sleep, then
the law should be scrutinized as a regulation of speech.
A law prohibiting the donning of red shirts on the First of May is a
law that will not fail the first prong of the expressive-conduct test, but
will fail the second prong of the test. Such a law will be classified as a
regulation of speech, and will further qualify as content-based. In
contrast, a law prohibiting parading in public streets after one o'clock
in the morning will not fail the second prong of the expressive-conduct
test, but will fail the first prong. Such a law will be classified as speech,
and will qualify as content-neutral. A regulation could fail prong two
of the test, yet still qualify as content-neutral. For example, an
ordinance prohibiting demonstrators from entering the White House
For an analogous case, see generally Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 359.
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while allowing tourists to enter will qualify as content-neutral.
Note that under the existing expressive-conduct analysis used by
the Court, a regulation that is facially content-based, or a regulation
that is based on the subject matter of the expression, may, in principle,
be classified as a regulation not aimed at the expressive element of the
conduct. Thus, a law prohibiting sleeping in the park for purposes of
expressing the plight of the homeless may, arguably, not be aimed at
expression. This odd result is a derivative of the Court's secondaryeffects analysis. Thus, the ban on sleeping in the park may be
characterized as not aimed at the expressive element of the conduct so
long as a correlation may be shown between, for example, excessive
littering and park sleepers expressing the plight of the homeless.
The definitions this Article offers of both content-based and
expressive-conduct regulations require that, whether the regulated
activity is predominantly engaged in for communicative purposes or
not, a regulation that is facially content-based receive exacting
constitutional scrutiny.
This, to reiterate, is not because it is
inconceivable that a regulation may be facially content-based yet aim at
noncommunicative activities. Rather, exacting scrutiny is warranted,
among other reasons, because of the improbability of such
government claims, whether made by government officials appraising
them or by government lawyers.'
In United States v. O'Brien, the case announcing the standard test
for regulations of expressive conduct, the Court upheld a regulation
forbidding the willful destruction of army draft cards.0 1 If O'Brien
were analyzed under the definition of expressive conduct proffered
in this Article, the first question to be asked, one that was never asked
by the Court, is whether the willful destruction of army draft cards is
an activity engaged in predominantly for the purpose of
communication. The answer does not call for an inquiry into the
government's purpose, an inquiry into which the Court explicitly
refused to engage. 0 2 Instead, the inquiry involves empirical statistical
data. 03 If the willful destruction of draft cards were a widespread
100 There are two additional reasons for an exacting constitutional scrutiny of
facially content-based regulations that are supposedly aimed at noncommunicative
impact: (1) The distinction between regulations aimed at noncommunicative impact
and those regulations that are not is untenable; and (2) even if a distinction between
regulations aimed at noncommunicative impact and those that are not were tenable,
the government's willingness to suppress speech that it does not favor renders the
distinction irrelevant.
1 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 386.
102

103

See id. at 383.

If, however, the challenged regulation is already on the books, the inquiry
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activity engaged in for noncommunicative purposes, such as ridding
oneself of extraneous paper, then the regulation forbidding such
willful destruction is a regulation of expressive conduct.' °4 If, on the
other hand, the willful destruction of army draft cards is engaged in
predominantly for purposes of communication, then the regulation
is a regulation of speech. It does not matter how the purpose of a
regulation is determined, or even what that purpose is determined to
be. If the regulation addresses activity predominantly engaged in for
communicative purposes, then there is a danger that the government
is seeking to control, or is controlling, public opinion. Such a danger
justifies further classification
of the regulation as either content-based
05
or content-neutral.

CONCLUSION

The definitions proposed in this Article for three First
Amendment doctrines derive from an understanding of the doctrines'
underlying rationales.
A doctrinal rationale may be explicitly
articulated by courts, as in the case of the content-based/contentneutral distinction, or a rationale may form a doctrine's implicit raisond'tre, as in the case of the expressive-conduct doctrine. Once a
rationale is proposed, a critique of the use of judicial doctrines may
proceed not on policy grounds, but on an analytical basis, assuming
that the formulations of the underlying rationale and the derived
definitions are accepted.
One might object that the discovery of such rationale resembles
the discovery of a law's purpose, and the Article mentioned the
difficulties associated with such an inquiry. There are a number of
responses to this argument, mostly derived from the different
institutional roles and methodologies employed by courts and by
legislatures. Courts arguably are required to reason as one, and then
justify, or explain, their doctrines. Legislatures, apart from often vague
statements of intent, are not required to explain their laws. This may
not only mean that the existence of such purpose, a questionable
would necessitate conjecture as to activity levels in the absence of the regulation.
104 Such a regulation is not a regulation of "pure" conduct
because O'Brien's
conduct was already classified by the Court as "expressive." See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
376.
105 In the former case, this regulation will be further classified
as content-based, as
it refers to the subject matter of the regulated expression: "Army draft cards" are
objects clearly identified with a certain subject matter, particularly at a time of war, as
to warrant a content-based classification. This does not mean that the regulation is
doomed. If the government can show a compelling interest and a narrowly drawn
law, then the regulation will be upheld.
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matter in the context of a legislative body, is more likely to be found in
the context of the judiciary, but also that the question of whose
purpose to look at, so problematic in the legislative context, is much
less so in the context of ajudicial opinion. An additional difference is
that judicial purposes, unlike legislative purposes, cannot be
ideologically controversial. The judiciary cannot operate upon highly
contestable premises because it cannot overly politicize itself.
But these answers dance around the correct retort: In articulating
doctrinal rationales, unlike statutory purposes, no discovery at all is
involved. This, one might say, is the prerogative of having both the
Such
promulgator and the interpreter residing in one body.
articulations derive legitimacy not from a claim to truth, such as a
statement that "the purpose of the legislator in enacting this law was..
.," but from the rigor of their own form. The process of adjudicating is
supposed to consist precisely of such reasoned propositions. Thus, the
rationales here offered for the three doctrines are not the purported
bearers of doctrinal truths. Rather, they are one way of making sense
of these doctrines, one interpretation that is open for public debate.
Alternative propositions, carrying with them different and potentially
opposing implications, are to compete under the standards of
coherence and consistency with those proposed in this Article. If the
secondary-effects doctrine can be rationally reconciled with the
content-based/content-neutral doctrine, let the marketplace of ideas
do so. New substance cannot be legitimized by old form: It must
withstand public scrutiny and be adopted, or abandoned, on its own
virtues or vices.

